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Article 7

On the Magic of Law
Abstract

This essay focuses on a forgotten and ill-reputed category, long used by anthropologists and historians to
describe the origins of law: the category of “magic.” At the end of the 19th century, many scholars found in the
idea of “magic” something that could explain why some sort of a necessity could be attached to certain actions,
paroles or rituals from which concrete, practical effects were expected in “primitive” societies. “Magic” was a
concept embodying a complete theory of performance, and of the necessity of the consequences produced by
this performance, that seemed to some of those scholars capable of explaining why necessity and performance
were also legal features. Yet, after World War II, the positivist school of legal historians chose to discard this
explanation, and to forget all about the possible links between law and magic. By re-reading the work of Paul
Huvelin, a forgotten French legal historian close to the circles of Emile Durkheim, I would like to claim that
this gesture was rather a form of foreclosure – foreclosure of the fact that law might very well be the last form
of magic in a world that refuses to admit its existence. Of course, the whole question is: Which magic? How
magic? Why magic? These are the questions that the essay tries to answer.
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On The Magic of Law
Laurent de Sutter*
1. From Lyon to Beirut
Who remembers Paul Huvelin? Despite having been one of the
few lawyers in the small crowd of scholars gathering around Émile
Durkheim, he seems to have vanished from memory – his sole
legacy apparently being a street named after him in the Achrafieh
neighbourhood of Beirut. This street received some kind of notoriety
when, in 2011, Mounir Maasri released a movie by the name Rue
Huvelin which tells the story of a group of students fighting against
Syrian occupation in Lebanon – all of them living in said street.
However, no direct reference to the person or the work of Huvelin
was made in the film, even though the French professor had earned
some local celebrity, in 1913, for being instrumental in setting up the
law school of Saint-Joseph University, in the centre of the city. At the
time, Huvelin had distanced himself slightly from scholarly work, and
had started to participate in the various attempts made by the French
government in trying to ensure the persistence of its influence in the
Middle East – hence the creation of the law school. It was something
quite unexpected from him, since what had made him famous, as a
professor at the university of Lyon, was his profound and original
expertise in the field of Roman law, especially in its most archaic forms.
From the moment of his inception at the university, in 1899, Huvelin
had published a bunch of powerful and compelling articles dedicated
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to various questions of Roman commercial law, gathered into one
volume by Henri Lévy-Bruhl after the death of their author (Huvelin
1929). He also had been recruited to serve in the editorial board of
L’Année sociologique, the journal created by Durkheim in 1898,
thanks to a friend already introduced to the sociologist, Emmanuel
Lévy – a lawyer now considered a precursor of legal socialism (Audren
and Karsenti 2004). But nothing could have predicted that Huvelin
would suddenly accept missions from the French state, and work as
a defender of French interests in the Middle East, where he not only
helped in founding the law school of Saint-Joseph, but also conducted
research in Syria and other countries. It will most probably never be
possible to clearly determine the reasons behind this shift in Huvelin’s
career – a shift parallel to a definite slowing down of his academic
production, and his growing involvement in the local political life of
Lyon. The only hypothesis that one could make is that Huvelin would
never have been content with the mere internal observation of law;
to him, there always had been more to law than what the growing
positivism of the time was ready to accept (Audren 2001).
2. Meeting Marcel Mauss
The attraction professed by Huvelin concerning the outside of law was
probably also what lead him to develop what would become a long
relationship with someone whose work had an enormous impact on
his own researches: Marcel Mauss. Before entering the University of
Lyon, Huvelin had been in charge of the important duty to introduce
students to Roman law at the University of Aix-en-Provence – where
he was assistant professor during the academic year 1898-1899. Telling
his friend Lévy that he was looking for case-study materials concerning
the study of rituals intended to cure diseases, the latter advised him to
write to Marcel Mauss, with whom he was acquainted, and ask him
for ideas. At that time, Mauss, who was 27 (Huvelin was 28), had only
published a couple of articles, among which a long Essai sur la nature
et la fonction de sacrifice co-signed with Henri Hubert, and published in
the journal edited by his uncle, who was no one but Durkheim himself
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(Hubert and Mauss 1899). Huvelin had read this article, and had
been impressed by the deep anthropological knowledge manifested by
Mauss – as he acknowledged openly in his first letter to the latter,
written on the 9th of June, 1899, so initiating a friendship lasting until
his own death, in 1924 (Audren 2001: 124). It is, therefore, not a
surprise that his discussions with Mauss left some traces in his own
work, starting with his article on Les tablettes magiques et le droit romain
published in 1901 in the Annales internationales d’histoire (Huvelin
1901). In this piece, Huvelin was trying to understand the curious link
existing, in Ancient Rome, between law and what the Romans called
tabulae defixionum – a device through which a curse could be enforced
upon another person, so that he or she would obey the cursor. Curses,
or defixiones, were of many types, and the tablets within which they
were engraved quite common, not only in Rome, but in the whole
antique world, especially in Athens (at least, if one was to believe Plato,
who mentioned them in the Republic and in the Laws) (Graf 2004).
Among the various types of tabullae, there was one that interested
Huvelin more than others: the ones concerning defixiones iudicariae,
namely curses formulated in order to put the adversary into trouble
in the framework of a judicial procedure. For Huvelin, the rites and
rituals attached to the practice of cursing pointed towards a mystery
with which he would keep himself busy during the next decade or so
– and which would cause a long quarrel with Mauss, who had other
views on the question: the mystery of the efficient power of law.
3. The Age of Magic
What makes law into something different than a mere set of words
whose only power would lie in the force of those strong enough to
make sure that one could not escape the consequences of one’s actions
– w at makes law something else than brute strength? This was the
question that started to slowly percolate through Huvelin’s mind,
although, of course, he did not formulate it in such terms – d spite
his own attraction for abstract questioning (something that he would
eventually be criticized for) (Audren 2001: 118). Even though he
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kept his questioning quite understated, he nevertheless suggested an
answer that that was both curious and timely: what if, he more or less
wrote, there was yet something to investigate apropos the relationship
between law and magic? At the end of the nineteenth century, magic
had indeed become a fashionable anthropological category, thanks
to the combined work of people such as Henry Codrington (who
published The Melanesians in 1891) or James Frazer (the first volume of
The Golden Bough appeared in 1890) (Codrington 1891; Frazer 1890).
Yet, even though both Frazer and Codrington pointed out the legal
or normative dimensions of magic, understood as an abstract force,
or mana, in certain non-Western civilizations, there was an important
difference between their findings and Huvelin’s hypothesis. For Frazer,
magic was what provided an explanation for the interaction existing
between things or beings without any physical contact whatsoever; it
was the ‘sympathetic’ force that allowed for the distant influence of
one being upon another – and that was basically it. Codrington views
were a little bit more sophisticated, but his description of the mana
cherished by the Melanesians did not bear any fruitful consequence
for the general understanding of law: mana was simply some kind
of an impersonal super-power with whom one had to deal, period.
According to the Melanesians, argued Codrington, every difference
of power, be it physical or institutional, should be understood as the
result of a manifestation of mana – and behind it, of the way someone
succeeded (or failed) at negotiating a favour from it. Of course, that
was not what Huvelin had in mind; rather than in supernatural forces,
or in the sympathetic action of a distant thing upon another, it was in
the practical functioning of concrete institutions that he was interested,
even if this functioning would require the performing of rites. To put
it into more technical terms, what Huvelin was looking for was an
explanation for the obligatory effect of obligations – since the efficiency
of law could not be detached from this Roman invention.
4. Birth of a Quarrel
This is precisely where the quarrel with Mauss emerged: one year
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after the publication of Huvelin’s article, the anthropologist, with
his old accomplice Hubert, published Esquisse d’une théorie générale
de la magie again in L’Année sociologique (Hubert and Mauss 1902).
In this voluminous text, now an absolute classic of human sciences,
Hubert and Mauss were trying to define what was missing in the
work of their predecessors, that is the very essence of a magical effect,
whatever its context or operations. This might have been of a great
interest for Huvelin, except that Hubert and Mauss decided to open
their essay with a distinction leaving aside every possibility to connect
law, be it in its very archaic form, and magic: the distinction between
magical and obligatory effect (ibid.: 11). Even though they did not
directly quote Huvelin, the two authors of the Esquisse must have
had his piece on tabullae defixionum in mind when they wrote that,
according to them, ‘some’ defended views leading to the confusion of
what should be carefully distinguished (ibid.). For Hubert and Mauss,
legal or judicial rites, rituals or formulas, could not be considered
as magic per se, since they were not producing any direct effect; if
they did, it was because they were magical or religious besides the
juridical context of their performance or utterance. For a gesture or a
parole to be considered as magic, there must be some actual creation,
some production at work, beyond what Hubert and Mauss called the
mere establishment of ‘contractual relationships’, as is the case with
obligations in the field of law (ibid.). This was the reason why they
allowed themselves not to consider any legal dispositive in the rest of
the article, preferring to devote themselves to the careful description of
the ‘elements’ of magic, leading to a general theory of magic as illusion
and belief (ibid.: 17). Of course, this was quite paradoxical – since the
efficiency of magic ultimately was, for Hubert and Mauss, the mere
set of social conventions through which a community would illusion
itself, so fulfilling some collective needs that could not be fulfilled
otherwise. Yet, they stayed true to their position; magic, they said, only
designates the efficiency of shared beliefs, responding to some social
requirements; as such, it belonged to the realm of representations, and
not to the realm of reality or of practices (ibid.: 84; Keck 2002). The
slap in the face was direct; in his piece on curse tablets, Huvelin had
127

Laurent de Sutter

precisely advocated that there was something practical to the very idea
of magic, and that law could illustrate what a magical practice could be;
but Hubert and Mauss would not listen.
5. Huvelin Strikes Back
It took several years to Huvelin to offer a reply to Hubert and Mauss’
Esquisse – years during which he was very much involved in the
preparation of his classes in Roman law, and in the history of commercial
law, his two domains of expertise. When he finally published Magie et
droit individuel in 1905, he had made one major step: he had been
appointed to the editorial board of L’Année sociologique – where he
eventually published his cryptic answer to his friend’s views on law and
magic (Huvelin 1905). Between Mauss and Huvelin, the quarrel had
never been opened; it was more of an erudite conversation between
persons of good manners, so that there never was a bitter comment, or
even an open disapproval, formulated on one side or the other. Magie
et droit individuel was not different on that respect; it even opened with
an overt praise for Hubert et Mauss’ piece, presented as a ‘decisive step’
in the history of the scientific study of magic, and the benchmark for
any future research on the topic (ibid.: 1). Obviously, some sort of a
disagreement was to be expected – but it only appeared after a couple
of pages of compliments, when Huvelin started to wonder about the
normativity at stake with the social order from which magic seems to
stem. If Hubert and Mauss were right in saying that, on the one hand,
magic was of a social nature, and, on the other, that there was something
mysterious to it, bringing it to the verge of the prohibited, then some
reason must be advanced for the contradiction to be functional. How
a social feature could be social, if it is at the same time prohibited by
the very society that it should help functioning, asked Huvelin; are we
not obliged to slightly revise our understanding of what a society is, or
of what magic is? Or else, he added, would it not be interesting to go
back to the facts, in order to try and see how some kind of conciliation
could be possible between the two – a conciliation developing from
the careful examination of the ‘practical applications’ of magic? (ibid.:
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3) When asking these questions, there was no doubt that Huvelin
was thinking about law; and if there still was a doubt, it would soon
vanish, since he added a correlate to what was said before – and a
correlate taken from Durkheim himself. Since, as the sociologist had
written in his De la division du travail social, in 1893, ‘law constitutes
the visible symbol of social solidarity’, and so the very incarnation of
social normativity, it was in the law that the theory of magic would find
its true grounding (ibid.: 4). Of course, it all depended on which kind
of law one was talking about.
6. Formalism Unlimited
At first sight, though, Huvelin was much more modest; rather than
criticizing Hubert and Mauss’ distinction, he started by emphasizing it,
stating that, indeed the realm of the juridical and the one of the magical
should be kept separate. Yet, in a footnote where all of his controversy
with Mauss was summarized in a few polite sentences, he deemed to
question not the distinction itself, or the understanding of the concept
of magic defended in Esquisse, but the concept of law used there
(ibid. n. 4). For Hubert and Mauss, Huvelin wrote, law must be kept
separated from magic on the ground that whereas the latter is based
on rituals, the former, on the contrary, lies upon convention – upon the
exchange of will expressed by two parties. Being an expert in the most
ancient forms of Roman law, he could not let such a characterization
of law go unnoticed, and reminded Hubert and Mauss of the fact that
the link between law and convention was nothing but problematic
– to say the least. The Roman legal system of the first years of the
Kingdom was indeed not based on conventions, but on forms, namely
‘the forms themselves that create or extinguish rights, independently
from any condition of will’, Huvelin argued in his footnote. ‘Will
without form produces no effect’, in such a system – whose antiquity
should not induce us to think that it constituted some past curiosity,
devoid of any relationship with law as it was to be grasped in a more
general way (ibid.). On the contrary, formalism was a key feature of
the Roman legal system up to the time of the Justinian codification,
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and a constant of law up to the present time, as was illustrated by the
doctrinal theory of the ‘declaration of will’, later studied by Raymond
Saleilles (1901). Even though Huvelin did not go that far, one could
easily have deduced from his demonstration that the exchange of will
through which a convention could be formed was precisely this: the
form of the convention – formalism still permeating under the veil
of conventionalism. For on reading Huvelin’s development closely,
it should have been clear that the French professor did not believe
that the distinction made by Hubert and Mauss should be kept intact
– contrarily to what he himself explicitly declared a few sentences
before. Because, was not the most striking trait of rituals precisely
that of heir formalism? Was not ritualism formalism merely put into
gestures, actions and formulas? And then, was not law, understood as
the practice of formalism, the very place where something could be
understood about magic, too?
7. Durkheim against Durkheim
What Huvelin was interested in was the efficiency of the form; this
was precisely why he could not accept the quick dismissal found in the
Esquisse of the role of law in an inquiry of what ‘efficiency’ means; but
this also is why he could not accept Durkheim’s views either. Indeed,
choosing to quote Durkheim in order to contradict Hubert and Mauss
was a bold, as well as paradoxical, operation – since its final outcome
took the form of a theory of law that was alien to both Durkheim’s and
Hubert and Mauss’ views at the same time. In their Esquisse, the latters
deliberately applied the main lessons of the former, in their choosing
of the explanandum of the success of magic in societies still functioning
with other rules and principles as, say, the European ones. For them,
magic was mainly a social affair – and so it was the structure of said
societies that could explain why their members were to believe in the
efficiency of what had so obviously none (outside of the consequences
of the belief themselves). The rest only belonging to anthropological
idiosyncrasies, whose description was of a great importance for the
comparative study of human forms of social life, but not for the general
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understanding of what a society is – so that it could be left aside.
Huvelin had another take on this point; for him, the details of the
rituals were precisely what mattered, because, being a lawyer, he knew
that if anything happens in the world, it is because of details being
carefully envisaged; take out the details, and the big picture crumbles.
Society never entails any effect; what entails an effect always is one
singular detail, one specific gesture or given set of words, inserted into a
broader context that only provides the ecology for this detail to lead to
the results being expected from it to produce. This was the reason why
Magie et droit individuel so much resembled an anthology of disparate
cases and examples from which no overarching story seemed to unfold,
and about which no explanation seemed completely satisfactory. In the
course of his listing of cases, Huvelin would only offer glimpses at a
possible general view, through short sentences resounding like hardto-decipher oracles, left suspended in the air, waiting for someone to
interpret them in one way or another. Yet, there was a moment when
the type of efficiency looked for by Huvelin as far as law and magic
were concerned somehow crystallized: the moment when he started
to answer the question of the obligatory effect of convention – the
question of what, in conventions, exceeded conventions.
8. Nexum, what else?
During a long period of time, said Huvelin, contracting and executing
contracts was possible one the sole grounds of magic; it was magic
that made it so that contracts could have any effect, and that this
effect could somehow be binding for the parties. To put it differently,
what made magic effective in contracts was the necessity of the
obligation at the core of any contract, from the very inception of the
notion of obligation in the Law of the Twelve Tables, to its canonical
formulation in Justinian’s Digest. The first example given by Huvelin
is the one of nexum – about which he had just provided a personal
interpretation in an article featured in the monumental Dictionnaire des
antiquités grecques et romaines edited by Edmond Saglio and Edmond
Pottier (Huvelin 1907; Benthien 2011). The nexum was a very curious
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institution of early Roman law providing some sort of guarantee for
the creditor of a debt to see the due sum being paid by the debtor,
when the latter did not have such a sum in his possession, and should
be left free to try and collect it. In order to ensure this freedom did
not metamorphose into a pure and simple escape, a hostage would
usually be provided to the debtor, preferably someone so close to the
debtor that he would not even consider not coming back (Girard 2003;
Noailles 1940). Of course, there were cases when there was no such
hostage at hand, and another trick was needed; this trick, according to
Huvelin’s interpretation of the nexum, was the personal involvement
of the debtor, making himself the hostage, while remaining free of his
moves (Huvelin 1905). But then again, how to guarantee that, once the
nexum duly formed, the debtor would not simply run away, laughing at
the fool who was stupid enough to be satisfied with the mere promise
that he would come back as a hostage if he could not find the money?
The answer, wrote Huvelin, was magic; more specifically, it was the
magic of some ritual cursing, implying that the person who would not
fulfil his duties would be subjected to the worst fate, a threat apparently
sufficient to make people do what they had to do (ibid.). This is how
conventions started to take place: as the personal engagement of a
debtor, accepting to submit himself to a ritual leading to his potential
cursing if he were not to perform his part of what was not yet a
contract – but almost. The most important fact, though, was not so
much that magic could be linked to the guaranteeing of contracts, but
that it revealed, contrarily to what Hubert and Mauss had assumed,
that contracts were not the result of a mere exchange of will; contracts
first implied an individual involvement (ibid.: 27).
9. In Praise of the Individual
Hubert and Mauss never really replied to Huvelin’s critique; but one
could imagine that, at this stage, they would have simply sniffed and
argued that such a description of the origins of legal obligations did
not change a thing with respect to what they wrote, since, in the end,
it was still about society. For someone to submit oneself to a ritual,
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and act accordingly, there must have been some social belief leading
to the internalization of the supposed normative power attached
to it; as such, it was not the cursing that produced effects, but the
belief itself. Huvelin would not completely disagree; as he pointed out
later in Magie et droit individuel the social dimension of conventions
should not be overlooked; there must be some ‘social adherence’ (as
he put it) to them; but it should not be overstated, too. There was, he
claimed, a specific ‘force’ of magic – and what happened with early
forms of conventions, such as nexum, was the transference of this force
to what he called ‘individual activity’, making so that the individual’s
involvement in a legal relationship could become stronger (ibid.: 42).
What mattered was not so much the social dimension of magic, or the
fact that it eventually was grounded on shared beliefs, but the fact that
there was an effective change in the force of the subject accepting to
participate to its own cursing as debtor. The magic was the magic of this
sudden possibility – of making so that a given individual was provided,
whatever the reality of it, a power exceeding the one at his disposal as
a common body, as a person more or less free to come and go in the
world. The magical dimension of a convention was that: the fact that
it did effectively change something in the debtor – the fact that it gave
him the power to grant his acceptance to submit himself to a ritual
making him able to participate in an obligatory relationship. Indeed,
this was hard to explain in terms of social normativity; it was rather
the functional necessity of a given dispositive that was at stake with
the phenomenon described by Huvelin – its internal necessity, rather
than the external necessity of the social context in which it took place.
Whereas Huber and Mauss, closer to the sociological orthodoxy of
Durkheim, focused on the social dimension of magic, and so expelled
law from its realm (being another social phenomenon), Huvelin
wanted to outline the importance of the individual. Even more so, he
wanted to stress that the individual could not be considered separately
from the institutions granting it a given place in society, and the power
to eventually change it – hence the link between law and magic.
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10. Goodbye, Sociology
Despite his blow to the Durkheimian orthodoxy, Huvelin stayed in the
editorial board of L’Année sociologique until the end of its first series,
in 1913 – even though he did not publish any new article, satisfying
himself with book reviews here and there. Law was too exotic a topic
to really lead to any controversy within the sociological entourage of
Durkheim; the fact is that Huvelin was the only one, with Lévy, to
possess the full range of technical knowledge of the discipline; the
others were only remotely interested (Cotterrell 2005). This might
explain why, at the time, no one seemed to notice Huvelin’s claims
– or, to put it in more direct terms, his radical critique of sociology,
and of the elementary conception of normativity defended by his
friends and colleagues. For the latter, normativity was an overarching
phenomenon, of which law was only a mere illustration, emerging at
a certain moment of history, in a certain context, in order to answer
certain social needs – even though this illustration was deemed capital.
For the former, normativity, so conceived, could not explain the specific
force manifested by law, nor the singularity of the functioning of its
dispositives; it would only make law the accessory of something else,
more general and more important. Of course, at the end of Magie et
droit individuel, Huvelin conceded that, if law and magic had something
in common, it was because they shared some sort of belonging to the
realm of religion and the sacred – both stemmed, in a twisted way,
from religious beliefs. Yet, as he put it, ‘in the field of law, magical rites
only are religious rites diverted from their regular social goal, and used
in order to achieve an individual will of belief […] The magical rite is
religious in its external appearance; it is antireligious only in it ends’.
(Huvelin 1905: 46) It was a clever way to state that, on the one hand,
the antinomy defended by Hubert and Mauss was not sustainable;
and that, on the other hand, the most crucial aspects of Durkheim’s
sociology could be maintained untouched – somehow. For a careful
reader, however, the gap separating the attempt at grounding the
efficiency of magic and of law in different areas of the social, from the
desire to understand this efficiency as an integral part of a dispositive
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centred upon individuals, was abyssal. Hubert and Mauss, like their
master Durkheim, wanted society to provide the alpha and omega of
normativity, whereas Huvelin was persuaded that there was no such
thing as normativity, but only tiny legal mechanisms requiring per se
analysis.
11. A Criticism by Georges Gurvitch
A few years after Huvelin’s death, though, an attempt was made by
Georges Gurvitch, in a study titled La magie et le droit, published in his
book Essais de sociologie, to prove the latter wrong, and, conversely, to
prove Durkheim, and then Hubert and Mauss, right (Gurvitch 1938).
According to Gurvitch, Huvelin committed a very important mistake:
his demonstration was based on some sort of circular reasoning, leaving
aside the fact that it had to presuppose the existence of an individual
right in order to open the floor for magic (ibid.: 40). Indeed, one could
question the importance of magic in the definition of a right, if this
right was already recognized by the one trying to assert it without its
intervention; in Huvelin’s argument, magic was simply playing the
role of indifferent decorum. For Gurvitch, on the contrary, magic
was something big; first of all, it had to be spelled with a major ‘M’,
something that neither Huvelin, nor even Hubert and Mauss, dared to
do, as if it was a kind of major instance, to whom a very special type
of respect was due. And indeed, it was the case: as Gurvitch stated it,
the concept of magic was a way to investigate what he called the ‘spirit’
of law, even though one had to be careful in avoiding to make it the
‘cause’ of law, and to describe it only in its ‘influences’. (ibid.: 39, 41)
Of course, in the end, things came back from where they started, and
Gurvitch was forced to admit that magic, as he saw it, was again a set
of beliefs of the same kind as, say, religious beliefs – which amounted to
the very radical conclusion that beliefs might influence law. In reality,
the purpose of Gurvitch’s criticism was to try and demonstrate that
Huvelin should have made one further step, and include in his analysis
what he called ‘social law’, namely the set of rules and mechanisms
exceeding the limits of individual conventions (ibid.: 71). Even though
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his own arguments were a little bit shabby, his purpose was rightful:
Huvelin’s view could have been more powerful if he had accepted that
individual rights were not the place of ultimate realization of magic
in law – or, at least, not only. If one were to get rid of the abstraction
of social normativity, one should have to take into consideration
the inner efficiency of the whole set of mechanisms through which
something other than individual bonds can be legally produced. Was
it not possible to imagine that magic could permeate through law in a
more general way than the one stated by Huvelin, that is, allowing for
the conclusion of a nexum in order to guarantee a debt – or the judicial
cursing at stake with tabullae defixionum? Gurvitch’s criticism was not
that bad, after all.
12. Towards Magical Legal Realism
Despite its limitations and the lack of echo that it received from both
sociologists and lawyers, Huvelin’s hypothesis benefitted from a life
of its own, somehow finding its way through the underground of
legal scholarship, up to the present day. If the French school of legal
history appearing after World War Two openly excommunicated
any views that might have even a remote relationship with the idea
of religion and of magic, the more recent era seems to become more
favourable to their re-examination (Gaudemet 2000). Huvelin’s work
was mentioned in both the Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et
de sociologie du droit, edited in 1991 by André-Jean Arnaud, and the
Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, edited in 2007 by Patrick
Arabeyre, Jean-Louis Halpérin and Jacques Krynen (Arnaud 1997;
Arabeyre, Halpérin and Krynen 2007). In the interval between these
two publications, some of Huvelin’s letters to Marcel Mauss had finally
been edited, with an introduction, by Frédéric Audren, and the general
context of his work, in particular its Durkheimian dimension, has been
outlined by Roger Cotterrell (Audren 2001; Cotterrell 2005). Other
works followed, testifying to a renewal of curiosity in the generation
of lawyers represented by Huvelin and Lévy, especially from the
point of view of their relationship to ideas customarily seen as far
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removed from contemporary lawyers’ preoccupations, such as socialism
(Audren and Karsenti 2004). Yet most of these different endeavours,
while finally recognizing the historical importance of Huvelin, have
remained remarkably discrete about his attempts at grounding the
necessary force of obligations in magic – as if this still represented
an embarrassment. Outside France (and the United Kingdom),
however, there were attempts at engaging with it, most notably Kaius
Tuori in Finland, who decided to follow the path opened by another
important lawyer having considered magic with a favourable eye: Axel
Hägerström. In his treatise on the roman concept of obligation, 1927,
Hägerström indeed discussed the idea that obligations, in Roman law,
originated in rites being performed, from which obligations received
their own power – quoting Huvelin himself (Hägerström 1927).
For him, too, the very idea of necessity at the core of any obligation
required an explanation that could not have been found in the mere
social context within which such an obligation would take place, or
in the beliefs of the participants to the rite. A few years later, in 1940,
in his famous book On Law and the State, Karl Olivecrona quoted
Hägerström’s theory, adding that, contrary to what one might think,
magical thinking was still a part of the functioning of law, if one was to
see it realistically (Olivecrona 2011).
13. Meanwhile, in the United States
The place of Hägerström and Olivecrona in the history of legal theory
is well known; both are considered as the fathers, and most prominent
figures, of what has been called Scandinavian Legal Realism, a school
of thought still highly considered today. Their main claim was that law
should not be considered metaphysically, as according to them was the
case then, but realistically, that is, without the philosophical apparatus,
and the call to transcendence that were the feature of the legal theory
of their time. Legal realism, according to Olivecrona, was the realism
that refused to consider law from the point of view of ‘mysticism’, and
instead chose to consider it from the point of view of ‘science’ – refusing
to provide grounding for law, and choosing instead to describe it (ibid.:
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45). Yet, for Olivecrona, it seemed that ‘magical thinking’ should be put
in the context of ‘science’ rather than of ‘mysticism’, as far as law was to be
considered, since magical rituals provided a more accurate description of
its obligatory force than other explanations (ibid.). Magic was an inherent
feature of realism – it was the acceptance of how certain early forms of law
needed magic in order to work, that defined the type of ‘science’ that the
tenets of Scandinavian Legal Realism advanced. And the fact was that
Hägerström and Olivecrona were right in claiming so, since they were
not the only type of realists calling for magic as a central category of legal
scholarship; before them, the most important American Legal Realist
of all times did the same. In his celebrated address to the students of
Boston University, in 1896, The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr. also suggested that true realism had something to do with magical
rites, under the form of what he called ‘prophecy’, a curious word for
such a rationalist (de Sutter 2014). If, seen from the present days, this
seems to be quite paradoxical, it was not for the time – a time when some
of the greatest thinkers, such as Holmes’ friend William James and his
French colleague Henri Bergson, were both proud to chair the newly
formed Society for Psychical Research. It was a part of the rationalism
of the time, even of the pragmatism of the time, to interest oneself, in
a constructive way, in all the phenomena apparently evading human
rationality, to try to expand rationalism’s ambit to new realms, beyond
the limitations imposed by any theoretical tradition (Menand 2002).
When Holmes addressed his students, Codrington and Frazer were the
hottest read one could hope for – and the lawyer was perfectly aware
of their discussion of the entanglement between law, magic and power.
14. The Psychology of Formalism
The end of the nineteenth century, and beginning of the twentieth,
was a moment when magic was everywhere, especially in societies
and civilizations foreign from the Western ones, so that they could
provide a useful contrast to either criticize or praise them. Huvelin’s
work provides a perfect example of the type of questioning that such
an omnipresence of the category of law could lead to, even though
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there was more to this than a mere historical remnant, as Tuori has
understood better than others. Recalling the Scandinavian tradition
of magical legal realism, the Finnish scholar dedicated some time
and effort in trying to weigh the interest of Huvelin’s reading of
nexum and the origins of the Roman concept of obligatio from the
point of view of contemporary science. In a much celebrated piece
on The Magic of Mancipatio, Tuori tried to reconsider the traditional
accounts given of the very specific procedure that mancipatio is, in its
connexion to earlier forms of what were not yet contracts, such as the
one of nexum (Tuori 2008). He cautiously concluded that here was no
definite evidence, in one direction or the other, to assess the magical
dimension of mancipatio, even if this procedure indeed involved some
sort of ritual – or, at least, as he called it, some sort of ‘formalism’ (ibid.:
481). This, already, was a nod towards Huvelin’s views, since the first
criticism that the latter opposed to Hubert and Mauss was precisely
the fact that they overlooked the formalistic dimension of the archaic
manifestations of law, and then of law in general. But Tuori went even
further; he stated that even if there were no obvious connection to the
supernatural involved in mancipatio, this did not mean that magic was
not a part of the forms involved at the time; it simply implied that these
form were not religious. The weakest point of Huvelin’s argumentation,
justifying Gurvitch’s regret, namely his attempt at justifying the social
role of magic through religion, and then forgetting social law itself, was
redeemed by a more clear-cut distinction. As Tuori wrote, ‘[t]he fact
that this legal ritual did not refer to the supernatural realm does not
mean that its psychological effect would not have resembled that of
magic’ (ibid.), meaning that the performance of a ritual could produce
such an effect in itself. Of course, the distinction was immediately
undermined by the fact that, according to Tuori, the question was
‘psychological’ more than anything else; the functional dimension
of magic within the ritual was not something that he was ready to
consider, despite his insistence upon its ‘performative’ character (ibid.)
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15. The Inner Necessity of Law
Maybe this was the last word on the question of magic: ‘performative’
– a word that has been introduced into the legal vocabulary due to
the success of (the examples of ) the linguistic theory of the speechact developed in the late 1950s by John Austin (Austin 1970). Yet,
compared to what has now become an evergreen of legal theory,
Huvelin’s ideas about the magic of law rested upon a very different
ground, since Austin’s speech-act was an act only insofar as there
was an institutional context justifying the power of the one acting.
Despite its apparent formalism, the speech-act theory was again some
sort of sociologism, albeit under linguistic disguise, whereas Huvelin
was only interested in the inner functioning of the legal act, and the
way magic could provide for the necessity of its consequences. What
Huvelin wanted was a theory of the legal act that was not dependent
upon the person who would utter the word (or make the gestures), but
on the words (or the gestures) themselves – and not because of their
meaning, but because of their, say, ‘genre’. There must be a certain type
of words or actions that can be called ‘magic’, and whose use within
a legal context produces necessary consequences, whatever the social
context is – and even, if one is to follow Tuori, whatever the religious
context is. There must be an inner necessity of law, or else it is only void –
that is, pure force, pure application of the relationship of power within
a certain group of human beings, pure legitimization of something
that would have happened anyway. Of course, this might very well be
possible, but then why do people insist so much upon law? Is it because
it would only be the ideological veil with which the darn truth was
covered, so that ‘people’ behaved? The reality is that, as weak and as
ideological as it might be, law still has an existence in itself – and this
existence cannot be denied by even the most ferocious critique of law
or the most encompassing sociological theory of the norm. If there
is something like law, then there must be something, in it that could
evade any attempt at providing an external justification or explanation
of its existence and functioning; this is precisely what Huvelin was
looking for and that he found, thanks to the concept of magic. What
he found was the inner necessity of the form, understood not in the
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sense of respect due to some formalities, but in the most specific sense
of forming – the giving of shape to what had none before, for instance
giving the shape of a debtor to someone who, before, was simply owing
money to somebody else.
Endnotes

* Professor of Legal Theory at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
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